Install the Vanta agent on a M1 Mac without Rosetta (and more)

April 30, 2022

Update: Vanta eventually released a version that’s M1-native so neither Rosetta nor the workaround below is needed anymore.

What you may still be interested with is the part where I observe the network logs of the Vanta agent to see if it’s doing anything fishy, as well as the update where I tell you what I found those logs.

Did you recently get asked to install the Vanta agent on your M1 Mac and got prompted to install Rosetta for it to run?

Do you like running a Rosetta-free system?

Then this post is for you.

Also if you also don’t like running (benevolent) spyware with root permissions, and want to monitor what the spyware is precisely spying about you, read on, I have a few other things for you. 😉

The Rosetta thing

I wrote a more generic post about this, and I encourage you to read it if you want to learn about all the technical details, but for the purpose of this Vanta-specific article, I’ll keep it short. The objective is to:

  1. Extract the vanta.pkg installer to access its contents.
  2. Update the Distribution XML file to flag ARM support (removes the Rosetta prompt).
  3. Extract the vanta-raw.pkg/Payload archive and replace the x86-64 osqueryd binary by the universal binary from version 5.2.2 (or greater).
  4. Repackage the whole thing.

Assuming you have vanta.pkg already downloaded (otherwise you can get it from here), run the following commands:

# Create a directory to extract the package into
mkdir vanta
cd vanta

# Extract the package in the current directory
xar -xf ../vanta.pkg

# Go in the subpackage
cd vanta-raw.pkg

# Create a directory to extract the payload into
mkdir PayloadOut
cd PayloadOut

# Extract the payload in the current directory
cpio -i < ../Payload

# Stream the tar archive for `osqueryd` 5.2.2 (follow redirects) and extract it to the current directory
curl --location '' | tar xf -

# We now have a `osqueryd` binary that we can move to the right location
mv osqueryd usr/local/vanta

# Recreate the cpio archive
find . | cpio -oz --owner 0:80 > ../Payload

# Go back to the parent directory and remove our temporary `PayloadOut` directory
cd ..
rm -rf PayloadOut

# Go back to the parent directory
cd ..

# Flag ARM support in the `Distribution` file
sed -i '' 's/<allowed-os-versions>/<options hostArchitectures="arm64,x86_64" \/>\n    <allowed-os-versions>/' Distribution

# Alternative with GNU sed
# gsed -i '/<installer-gui-script/a \    <options hostArchitectures="arm64,x86_64" />' Distribution

# Repackage the main installer
xar --compression none -cf ../vanta-new.pkg .

This will give you a vanta-new.pkg installer that now has proper ARM support and won’t prompt you to install Rosetta!

Again if you want to know precisely how this works, check out my detailed article on the topic.

But while having native M1 support is great, there’s still a few things that concern me about this program.

For example, I didn’t actually run that installer on my machine because it requires root permissions and I don’t want to run untrusted code as root. I still tested the package in a macOS VM (which is surprisingly easy to do nowdays) to confirm that the script works end-to-end. But for a machine I care about, how do we install and run that thing with only user privileges?

Installing and running Vanta without root privilege

It’s unclear what the this program does concretely, but it claims to be read-only (“it will not change anything on your machine”), despite their installer and other commands requesting root access (this is fishy AF).

I don’t like running as root anything that wasn’t shipped by Apple as part of the macOS base system, with the exception of some specific open-source programs in very particular cases (e.g. some nmap invocations and such), or programs like nginx that I trust to properly drop privileges after starting and binding to a reserved port.

This is definitely not the case of this agent, and there’s no way this thing is going to run as root.

So how do we run it without giving it superuser privileges? First, we need to dissect the package a bit and install it manually.

In the first part, we already extracted the installer as well as the Payload archive, in a PayloadOut directory. We’ll start from there, and go in the PayloadOut directory to manually install everything we need.

First we’ll copy Library/LaunchDaemons/com.vanta.metalauncher.plist to ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.vanta.metalauncher.plist. Why? Launch daemons are systematically run as root while launch agents are user services. Their format is otherwise compatible so that makes things easy for us.

cp Library/LaunchDaemons/com.vanta.metalauncher.plist ~/Library/LaunchAgents

We also replace the error log path in that file to point to a location where we actually have write permission:

sed -i '' 's,/var/log/vanta_stderr.log,/usr/local/vanta/log/vanta_stderr.log,' ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.vanta.metalauncher.plist

Then we can copy etc/vanta.conf and usr/local/vanta to /etc/ and /usr/local respectively.

sudo cp etc/vanta.conf /etc
sudo cp -r usr/local/vanta /usr/local

Note: OK I lied earlier, we do need root permission for this step. But at no point in this section we’ll run third-party code as root, and that’s what I intended by “without root privilege”.

Also, keep in mind that we need to copy the vanta directory to /usr/local because that path is actually hardcoded everywhere in the software binaries so we can’t easily run it from another location.

Vanta asserts that some binaries are owned by root, and refuses to run otherwise. Once owned by root though, the program runs just fine even from a user account.

sudo chown root:admin /usr/local/vanta/launcher
sudo chown root:admin /usr/local/vanta/osqueryd

Then, edit the /etc/vanta.conf file to set your agent key and email.

Finally we can start the service:

launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.vanta.metalauncher.plist

You can alternatively start the agent from any CLI instead of using launchd:


Note: the agent needs to be started using an absolute path if you want the vanta-cli and the Vanta app in the tray to report that the agent is running. If you cd /usr/local/vanta and run ./metalauncher, those other tools will think it’s not running even though the agent is actually running and reporting properly. 😅

And we’re up! The logs are happily reporting that everything is running fine, and the menu bar app (if you chose to run it) also reports that the agent is running.

Note: if you don’t want your menu bar to be “polluted” by the Vanta icon, I think there’s a setting to hide it, or even better, just get rid of /usr/local/vanta/Vanta and you won’t see it ever again!

All that app seems to be really doing is ps aux | grep /usr/local/vanta/metalauncher to check that the agent is running, so you can easily do that yourself if you want.

But Val, how do you know that the agent is working properly after you installed it in such an esoteric way?

Well, thanks to the VM I mentioned earlier, I could test that the network traffic of the agent installed with the original x86-64 package is identical to that of my method without root. 😁

But Val, how do you see the network traffic of the app? It’s all HTTPS and stuff.


Spying on the spyware and monitoring its network traffic

This agent is essentially a spyware that employees willingly install on their work computer (or employers secretly install in some less ethical cases) to spy on them with good intentions.

I’m more comfortable being spied on when I know precisely what is captured and what is not. A salesperson can always say “don’t worry, we respect your privacy”, but I tend to trust HTTPS traffic logs better. 😏

Ways to sniff packets

There’s a multitude of ways to sniff network traffic from an app. If all you care about is transport layer data (e.g. raw TCP or UDP traffic), you can easily monitor it with tools like tcpdump(8) or Wireshark. But for encrypted HTTPS traffic, that won’t cut it (and that’s the whole point of HTTPS).

When you have some control over the application you want to monitor, or if it natively supports running through a proxy, a logging HTTPS proxy like mitmproxy is really useful. Some software support communicating over a proxy through the pretty common http_proxy and https_proxy environment variables. Others support configuring a proxy via configuration files, UI, or command line arguments. If this is your case, you’re in luck, and you can use those means to make that program run its HTTPS traffic through mitmproxy!

Otherwise, you need to dig deeper and tools like tsocks(1), ProxyChains, ProxyChains-NG and graftcp (my personal favorite), can really help. I wrote a dedicated article on the matter if you’re interested!

The --proxy_hostname argument

In our case, it turns out that Vanta uses the open-source osquery program, which allows defining a custom proxy (see --proxy_hostname on this page)!

So all we need to do is add our own --proxy_hostname to the osqueryd arguments. While we don’t control the invocation of osqueryd (it’s in the Vanta launcher binary), we can easily achieve this by wrapping the osqueryd binary with a shell script:

mv osqueryd osqueryd-orig

cat << EOF > osqueryd
#!/bin/sh -e

exec /usr/local/vanta/osqueryd-orig --proxy_hostname=localhost:1337 "$@"

chmod +x osqueryd

With that shell script, we invoke the original osqueryd binary, passing our custom --proxy_hostname option (here with a proxy running on port 1337), and otherwise forwarding all other arguments.

What about certificates?

In order to intercept HTTPS traffic, mitmproxy uses its own certificate, that you can find in ~/.mitmproxy/mitmproxy-ca-cert.pem. You can add it to your system’s trusted certificates list, and as long as the software you’re monitoring uses the system CA certificates list, you should be good!

However Vanta pins their own certificate chain (using the --tls_server_certs option), ignoring the certificates trusted at the OS level.

The good news is that this pinned certificate is stored in /usr/local/vanta/cert.pem, and we can just replace it with the mitmproxy certificate!

sudo cat ~/.mitmproxy/mitmproxy-ca-cert.pem > /usr/local/vanta/cert.pem

After that, and restarting the service, we should be able to monitor the traffic:

launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.vanta.metalauncher.plist
launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.vanta.metalauncher.plist

Dump with mitmdump

mitmproxy is great to interactively monitor the intercepted traffic, but you don’t want to be watching that all the time. Instead, mitmdump can be used to log the captured traffic to a file. Then you can parse that file and query it the way you like.

mitmdump -w +/path/to/dump/file --listen-host --listen-port 1337

Here, -w specifies the file we want to log to, and it’s prefixed by + because we want to append to it instead of truncating it. The other arguments are self-explanatory.

To start it as a launch agent the same way we start the Vanta agent, we can add the following to ~/Library/LaunchAgents/mitmdump.plist:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "">
<plist version="1.0">

And enable it with:

launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/mitmdump.plist

Check that it all worked

Finally, you can confirm that the agent is registered properly after all those tweaks by checking the following link:

Where YOUR-HARDWARE-UUID is your hardware UUID as it can be found in the Apple menu, in About This Mac > System Report > Hardware UUID.

Analyzing the mitmproxy logs

After monitoring the mitmproxy logs of the Vanta agent over a few months, I didn’t find anything suspicious.

At least for my employer’s configuration (SOC 2 type 1 compliance), they only check the OS version, whether or not the disk is encrypted, whether or not my account has a password, and if there’s an autolocking mechanism after a precise period of inactivity.

It also reports the version of each browser extensions and installed apps, the list of users in the system, as well as the public SSH keys allowed to access my user account.

Periodically, it updates a list of known malware paths and fingerprints, in order to check that those are not found on the system.

Finally there’s a mechanism that allows the server it’s registered with to send “custom queries” but it was not used during the period I monitored it. If it was to be used it, their API doesn’t seem to allow running arbitrary shell commands, rather it could run read-only “queries” as exposed by the osquery SQL-like interface which is something to keep in mind.

Based on those observations, I saw no problem (for my own standards) running the agent on a work computer solely dedicated to the company that requires running the agent.


As an abundance of caution, I wouldn’t run the Vanta agent on a computer that I also use as a personal machine, nor on a computer that I use to work with other clients.

Therefore, I require each of my clients who need the Vanta agent to provide me with a dedicated work machine. Luckily it’s only 2 of them for now. 😆

Anyway, I don’t think it would be easy to make 2 independent registrations of the Vanta agent cohabitate on the same computer, let alone the fact that doing so would more likely be considered as a SOC 2 violation.

That’s all for today! I hope you found on this page what is it you were looking for, and that you learnt a thing or two along the way! Or at least that you enjoyed reading through my adventures messing around with this program. 😂

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